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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
EVELYN SMITH ))Plaintiff and Respondent, )
V. )
)
COMMISSION OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND )HOUSING, ))
Defendant and Petitioners, )
)KENNETH C. PHILLIPS et al., )
)
Real Parties in Interest )
________________________________________________)
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
On Original Petition from a Decision by the Office of Administrative Hearings of the State of California The Honorable Karl S. Engeman, Administrative Law Judge
Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeal,Third District
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
On April 17, 1987 Kenneth C. Phillips and Gail Randall filed
a complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and
Housing alleging that Mrs. Evelyn Smith violated the Fair
Employment and Housing Act and the Unruh Civil Rights Act when
she refused to rent them an apartment. (Cleric’s Transcript 3.)^
An administrative law judge ruled against Mrs. Smith on August
17, 1989, ordering her to pay damages, cease discrimination, and
^ Hereafter, "C.T.” refers to the Clerk's Transcript.
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to post notices describing the judgment rendered against her. 
(C.T. 2, 14.) Following an unsuccessful appeal to the Fair 
Employment and Housing Commission, Mrs. Smith submitted a
petition for a writ of mandate to the Superior Court of the St^^e 
of California for the County of Butte on September 12, 1989.
(C.T. 19.) The California Court of Appeal for the Third 
Appellate District granted an Alternate Writ of Mandate on 
November 30, 1989, which set aside the judgment against Mrs. 
Smith. (C.T. 38.) The Court of Appeal issued its decision on 
May 26, 1994 in favor of Mrs. Smith. Smith v. Commiggion of 
Employment and Housing. 30 Cal. App. 4th 1008 (1994). On May 
1994, Mr. Phillips and Ms. Randall petitioned for a rehearing. 
(C.T. 57.) Their petition was denied on June 23, 1994. (C.T.
60.) The Fair Employment & Housing Commission petitioned the 
California Supreme Court for review of the Court of Appeal 
decision on July 1, 1994. (C.T. 62.) The Supreme Court granted
review on September 8, 1994. (C.T. 64.)
Statement of FaotH
Mrs. Evelyn Smith is an elderly widow who owns and leases 
four housing units in Chico, California. fC.T. 3.). Rents from 
these units are Mrs. Smith’s sole source of income. Mr. Phillips 
and Ms. Randall, presenting themselves as a married couple.
(C.T. 4.) Mrs. Smith refused to rent to the couple when they 
eventually disclosed that they were not married, because it would 
have violated her religious beliefs and practices to do so.
(C.T. 5.)
Mrs. Smith customarily tells unmarried couples who wish to 
rent her units that she prefers to rent to married couples.
(C.T. 4.) Mrs. Smith has rented her units to single, divorced 
and widowed individuals. (C.T. 4.) She would not rent to any 
couple who represented that they enjoyed an intimate, non-marital 
relationship.
Mrs. Smith is a twenty-five year member of the Presbyterian 
church and subscribes to its tenets. (C.T. 4.) The Presbyterian 
creed, in keeping with the precepts of the variety of Christian 
religions, teaches that sex outside of marriage is a sin. Mrs. 
Smith believes that sheltering an extramarital romantic 
partnership would be a sin, and would prevent her from reuniting 
with her late husband in the afterlife. (C.T. 4.) It is her 
sincere belief that if she is forced to accommodate the 
extramarital sexual partnerships of prospective tenants, her 
religious practice and its benefits and guarantees will be 
irrevocably undermined.
applied to rent an apartment from Mrs. Smith in April, 1987.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Does the California Fair Employment & Housing Act protect 
individuals, rather than couples?
2. Should the strict scrutiny of government interests 
historically exercised by the California and federal courts, 
and recently codified by Congress, be applied when state 
actions infringe a property owner’s state and federal 
constitutional right to free exercise of religion?
3. Is a property owner’s state and federal constitutional right 
to freely exercise religion impermissibly violated when 
balanced against a state administrative agency’s interest in 
compelling her to rent to an unmarried couple on the basis 
of their status as unmarried romantic partners?
4
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The California Fair Employment & Housing Commission 
(hereafter, ”The Commission") has imposed on Mrs. Evelyn Smith, a 
religious woman, the unconstitutional choice either to forego her 
religious beliefs or to surrender her rights to do business and 
possess property. The Commission wrongly applied the Fair 
Employment & Housing Act (hereafter, "FEHA") to unmarried 
couples, and impermissibly burdened Mrs. Smith’s right to freely 
exercise religion. Mrs. Smith should not be coerced into acting 
against her deepest convictions merely to further the state’s 
efficiency in enforcing its laws. Four arguments support this 
conclusion.
First, unmarried couples are not protected by the state 
regulations prohibiting discrimination in housing. The 
Commission incorrectly construed FEHA to encompass the claims 
presented by Mr. Phillips and Ms. Randall. Unmarried couples are 
not encompassed by FEHA, and the discrimination that was alleged 
has not occurred.
Second, if unmarried couples are protected under FEHA, the 
state’s interest in FEHA must be balanced against the substantial 
burden this regulation places on Mrs. Smith’s religious belief. 
The compelling interest test articulated in Sherbert Y. Verner
5
Third, under the balancing required to complete the free I 
exercise analysis, the Commission has failed to demonstrate that ^ 
its interest is both compelling and narrowly applied. The state 
has no overriding or essential interest in forcing a widowed 
owner of two duplexes to rent to a couple on the basis of their 
status as unmarried romantic partners. Neither has the state me^ 
the further requirement that the burden it imposes on religion 
must be administered by the least restrictive means available.
Finally, even if it is evaluated under a rational basis, oi* 
incidental effects test, the state regulation as it has been 
applied by the Commission in this case violates the Free Exercis® 
Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions.
ARGUMENT
Because this case addresses constitutional issues and 
important matters of state interest, the standard of review is 
novo. Raven v. Deukmeiian. 52 Cal. 3d 336 (1990).
I. UNMARRIED COUPLES ARE NOT PROTECTED BY FEHA. iJ
The Fair Employment & Housing Act (hereafter, "FEHA"), 
incorporating certain provisions of the Unruh Civil Rights Act 
(hereafter, "Unruh Act"), protects individuals from marital
must be applied to evaluate the burdens and the interests in thi^
case. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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Code §§ 12955, 12948 (Deering's Supp. 1995)* , Cal. Civ. Code §§
51, 51.7 (Deering’s Supp. 1995). Unmarried couples are not 
encompassed by this statute for three reasons. First, the 
relevant statutory language plainly protects individuals, and not 
romantic partnerships. Second, the Legislature did not intend to 
protect unmarried couples under FEHA. Third, California cases 
applying FEHA and the Unruh Act to marital status discrimination 
support this conclusion.
A. FEHA Protects Individuals. Rather Than Couplefl.
In the instant case, Mr. Phillips and Ms. Randall presented 
themselves to Mrs. Smith, and now present themselves to this 
Court, as a couple. It is uncontroverted that Mrs. Smith’s 
objection to renting to this couple was based solely on their 
voluntary representation of their intimate relationship. 
Furthermore, their discrimination claim is built on the 
proposition that their romantic partnership is an entity entitled 
to the legal and societal shelter accorded married couples.
status discrimination in employment and housing.* Cal. Gov't.
> Hereafter, all references to "FEHA" include those provisions of the 
Unruh Act which FEHA incorporates. References to the "Unr\ih Act" are to that 
act alone.
* Hereafter, all statutory references, unless otherwise specified, are 
to the California Government Code. Cal. Gov't Code (Deering's 1991).
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FEHA, however, extends protection to individuals, not 
couples. No matter how other conditions of FEHA, including the 
term "marital status", are construed, its provisions do not 
encompass the Phillips-Randall claim.
1. The text_Qf FEHA limits its protections to 
individuals.
The unlawful practices proscribed by FEHA are limited to 
practices that affect individuals. It is unlawful to 
discriminate in housing "against any person because of the . . , 
marital status ... of such person." § 12955 (emphasis added). 
This language is consistent throughout the text of the act.
For example, FEHA protects the rights of "all persons" to 
obtain employment and housing without discrimination on account 
of enumerated characteristics. § 12920. The definitions of 
employee, age, and medical condition all specify "persons". § 
12926. The definition of housing discrimination also describes 
rentals to "person[s]". § 12927. Finally, "person" under FEHA 
includes "one or more individuals", or one of a variety of 
fiduciary relationships. S 12925 (d).
2. The plain meaning of "person" definitively 
precludes couples from FEHA’s protections.
The plain meaning of "person" is "an individual human 
being." Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 855 (11th ed. 1977)
8
An individual is "a particular being as distinguished from a 
class"; ”a single human being." Id.
3. The plain meaning of a statutory term must be
enforced.
There is no ambiguity or uncertainty in these relevant 
provisions of FEHA, or in their interpretation. When the text of 
a statute may be construed unambiguously, the meaning is plain 
and must be given effect. Halberfs Lumber. Inc, v. Luckv
Tnc.. 6 Cal. App. 4th 1233, 1239 (1992). No further 
interpretive inquiry is required. Id^ The plain meaning of 
"person", then, is determinative in this context. Consequently, 
Mr. Phillips and Ms. Randall may allege no discrimination against 
them as a couple under FEHA.
4. "Marital status" does not describe who is 
protected bv FEHA. but rather, describes what is
prohibited by FEHA.
The meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single 
word or phrase alone, and provisions relating to the same subject 
matter must be "harmonized to the extent possible." Lunoren v. 
Deukmeiian. 45 Cal. 3d 727, 735 (1988). "Marital status", 
therefore, must be construed in harmony with "persons", in order 
to understand the statute reasonably. Furthermore, statutory
9
construction should not lead to absurdity. Dyna-Med. Inc, v 
Fair Employment & Housing Comm’n.. 43 Cal. 3d 1379 (1987).
"Marital status" denotes the basis of discrimination, not 1 
the subject of protection, FEHA protects persons against adverse 
decisions based on classifications which may not be the grounds 
for discrimination. Marital status, like race and sex, is one 
such classification. No logical inference may be made that 
protection under FEHA extends to unmarried couples on the basis 
of this provision, which does not extend protection, but rather 
describes its grounds. To confuse the objectives of these two 
different provisions would lead to absurd results.* In order to 
be meaningful, the section including "marital status" must be 
understood to refer to the basis, not the target, of 
discrimination.
B. The Legislature Did Not Intend to Protect Unmarried
Couples Under FEHA or the Unruh Act.
Legislative intent may be ascertained from the words of 
statutes and their context; from the objectives of a statute; 
from the history of the times; from other legislation on the
* This understanding of how the classifying provision operates is 
clearer when expressed in FEHA’s other prohibited classifications. To state, 
for example, that gendered persons and persons of national origin are 
protected by FEHA re-states the obvious, but unhelpful, observation that 
persons are protected under § 12955.
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subject; and from public policy. jQfdt Y« State Board Qf 
Education. 35 Cal. App. 2d 591, 594 {1934). Statutes must be 
interpreted consistently with the apparent legislative purpose, 
and with results in mind that would effect a "wise policy rather 
than mischief." Dyna-Med. 43 Cal. 3d at 1391.
FEHA’s words and their context, and FEHA’s objectives, all 
establish that the Legislature intended to protect individuals 
from discrimination in housing and employment. No protection for 
unmarried couples was intended. The public policies favoring 
marriage and protecting families also support this conclusion.
The State of California itself reasonably differentiates® 
between unmarried couples and legally married couples in the laws 
of intestate succession and wrongful death, among others. SSfi 
Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co.. 133 Cal. App. 3d 890, 893 (1982). 
State tort law provides no cause of action for loss of consortium 
for unmarried partners. Ledger v- Tipoitt. 164 Cal. App. 3d 625 
(1985). Likewise, unmarried partners have been denied medical 
benefits extended to families. Hinman v. Department of FfirSOimel 
Admin.■ 167 Cal. App. 3d 516 (1985). These reasonable
5 "Discrimination is defined as a failure to treat all persons equally 
where no reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and those 
not favored." Baker v. California Land Title Co.. D.C. Cal., 349 F.Supp. 235, 
238, 239 (1972).
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distinctions support the state’s very strong interest in the 
institution of marriage. See Elden v. Sheldon/ 46 Cal. 3d 267 
(1988).
Furthermore, there is a national policy that marriage is the 
"foundation of family and society, without which there would be 
neither freedom nor progress." Zablocki v- Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 
(1978) (citing Maynard v. Hill. 125 U.S. 190 (1888)). Reading i 
FEHA to protect unmarried couples would therefore directly 
contravene both the state and national policies to encourage 
married relationships.
Moreover, the policies disfavoring unmarried couples as 
couples are numerous and forceful. Even in cases where long­
term, but un-"solemnized" partnerships exist, no rights greater 
than those extended to individuals have been extended. Cal. Code 
Civ. Proc. §§ 68, 69, 70 (Deering's 1991); Safi Marvin V. Marvin/ 
18 Cal. 3d 660 (1976).
C. The California Cases Enforcing FEHA’s Prohibition
Against Marital Status Discrimination Are Consistenf^ 
With This View.
FEHA was applied solely to individuals in RobinaPH V,_Fair
Employment & Housing Comm’rL. . 2 Cal. 4th 226 (1992). In 
Robinson, this Court held that employees must each be counted 
when determining how many persons are regularly employed in a
12
business. Similarly, Hess v^Fair Employment & Houainy
Comm’n. decided that damages assessed for marital status 
discrimination must be awarded to each individual complainant, 
not complainants jointly. 138 Cal. App. 3d 232, 235 (1982). The 
court in Hess directly considered whether to award damages to the 
plaintiffs individually, or to plaintiffs as a couple, and 
decided it would contravene the legislature's intent to make one 
award to plaintiffs as a couple. Hess thus limited the language 
of § 12925(d) ("'Person' includes one or more individuals") to 
mean one person only. Id. at 235.
Likewise, FEHA has been applied to cohabiting adults, but 
not to couples on the basis of a romantic partnership, Atkisson 
V. Kern County Housing Authority held that the eviction of an 
unmarried public housing tenant because she lived with another 
unrelated adult was discrimination on constitutional and federal 
regulatory grounds. 59 Cal. App. 3d 89 (1976) . The Atkisson 
court, however, did not consider whether FEHA would shield 
unmarried couples who asked for protection for their unsanctified 
relationships. Id. at 99. In that respect, the decision stayed 
squarely within the terms of FEHA as they are defined here.
The circumstances in this case, however, introduce factors 
beyond the scope of Atkisson. Mr. Phillips and Ms. Randall are
13
not simply unrelated adults who hope to share an apartment. TheV 
represented from their initial encounter with Mrs. Smith that 
they wished to be understood and treated by the law as a couple, 
with the rights accorded married couples. Importantly, while 
unmarried cohabiting adults might well share living quarters 
without disturbing Mrs. Smith's religious beliefs, unmarried 
couples who are intimately involved necessarily do so.
Finally, under the Unruh Act, housing discrimination based 
on sexual orientation is prohibited, but these decisions have 
been applied to individuals, and not couples. y, yy-j •] ]-j
133 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 3 (1982) . Indeed, the Attorney General 
gave his opinion that the Unruh Act on its own terms would apply 
to marital status discrimination. However, that opinion also 
consistently referred to protecting "persons". 58 Ops. Cal.
Atty. Gen. 608 (1975).
II. THE COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTEREST TEST MUST BE APPLIED IN
THE PRESENT CASE.
Freedom of religion is a fundamental, liberty under both the 
United States and California Constitutions. U.S. Const, amend.
I; Cal. Const, art. I, § 4. The First Amendment free exercise
protection provided by the United States Constitution applies to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const, amend.
14
I; U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Cantwell v. Connecticut. 310 U.S. 296
(1947) .
Generally, two tests are available to determine whether a 
person's free exercise right is infringed by state intrusion.
The compelling government interest test first articulated in 
Rharbert v. Verner applies heightened scrutiny to a state action 
burdening religion, requiring the state to demonstrate an 
extremely high interest in order to overcome the paramount values 
embodied in the Free Exercise Clause. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) .
First, a person challenging a state action must possess a 
sincere religious belief. Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205, 215
fV
(1972) . Government action substantially burdening religious 
practice emanating from a sincere belief is subject to a 
balancing test. Id*, at 214. Once it is established that a 
person’s sincere belief is burdened by a government regulation, 
the state must demonstrate its interest in the regulation is 
compelling enough to outweigh the burden on religious freedom. 
Mnlko v- Holy Spirit Ass'n.. 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1117 (1988). The 
greater the burden on religious practice, the higher the 
government interest must be. Id... at 1113.
Even a compelling government regulation that burdens 
religion is impermissible unless the government demonstrates that
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no less restrictive means of satisfying its interest is 
available. Thomas v. Review Bd.. Ind. Empl. Sec. Div.. 450 U.S. 
707 (1981). Finally, the state action must advance secular 
goals, and must not discriminate between religions or between 
religion and non-religion. Mo11;q at 1119 (citing Braunfield v. 
Brown. 366 U.S. 599 at 607 (1961)).
By contrast, the incidental effects test set out in the 
recent and highly contested decision in Employment Div.. Dept, of 
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, initially evaluates a 
regulation challenged on a free exercise basis by assessing the 
statute’s neutrality. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) . The incidental 
effects test holds that the Free Exercise Clause is only 
implicated once a law discriminates against religious beliefs or 
prohibits conduct because it is "undertaken for religious 
reasons." Church of Lukumi Babalu Ave. Inc._v. City of Hialeah. 
509 U.S. _, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 2226 (1993) (citing McDaniel v. Patv. 
435 U.S. 618 (1978)). The initial inquiry under this test is to 
determine if the law is neutral and generally applicable. Both 
facial neutrality and the effects of the law may be considered.
Once it is established that the challenged statute is not 
neutral or generally applicable, then the state must demonstrate 
its compelling interest. Id.
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One of these tests must be applied in each of the three
analytical contexts presented by this case. Because Mrs. Smith 
makes both a state and a federal constitutional claim, both a 
state and a federal constitutional analysis must be made. 
Additionally, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (hereafter, 
"RFRA"), which codifies the compelling interest test in free 
exercise cases, must also be applied. 42 U.S.C.A. 2000bb 
(Deering's Supp. 1995). Under each analysis, the compelling 
interest test prevails.
A. The Compelling Interest Teat Applies Under an
Independent California Constitutional Analvaifl.
1. A California constitutional claim mu3t_be 
determined independently.
The California Constitution is not dependent on the federal 
Constitution for meaning, even where its provisions are 
substantially the same. Cal. Const, art. I, § 24. Accordingly, 
California courts must independently determine the scope of a 
claim asserted under the California Constitution. Sanda 
Mnronoo Unified School District. 225 Cal. App. 3d 1385 (1989). 
Mrs. Smith has made such a claim here and is entitled to a 
specific judgment on the application of California’s 
constitutional religious liberty protections to her case.
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2. r;^i-iforn-ia rourts have adoDt.ftd ths Compellingint^T-pflt: test on ademiat.e and iildependenf
at^ate grounds.
This Court has generally relied on the Sherbert line of 
cases to determine both federal and state free exercise claims. 
Soon after Sherbert was decided, People v. WoodY applied the 
balancing test to facts closely similar to those in Smitb/ 
finding that members of the Native American Church could not be 
prosecuted for unlawful possession of peyote. 61 Cal. 2d 716 
(1964). Molko decided a free exercise defense to fraud under 
both the state and federal Constitutions, incorporating the 
federal analysis with the state inquiry. 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1113 
(1988). Walker v. Superior Court relied on Yoder and Thomas to 
determine that a parent providing only prayer treatment to a sick 
child was not absolutely protected from criminal liability under 
either state or federal constitutional provisions. 47 Cal. 3d 
112 (1988).
Both Molko and Walker followed the rule established in 
Michigan v. Long, that a state Supreme Court’s decision on 
adequate and independent state grounds would not be reviewed as 
long as its basis was "clearly and expressly" indicated. 463 
U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). The state court must only show "by a 
plain statement . . . that the federal cases are being used for
18
the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result
the court has reached." I5L. Woody, preceding Long, was not 
required to include such a statement, but mentioned the 
defendants’ reliance on the California Constitution. Woody. 61 
Cal. 2d at 717 n.l.
Because this Court has adopted the federal balancing test 
under a separate analysis of the California Constitution, recent 
shifts in federal free exercise jurisprudence leave the balancing 
test intact in the state constitutional context.
3. Cogent reasons and strong countervailing
circumstances compel construing California’s Free
Flxercise protection separately from the federal
approach.
The California Supreme Court is the court of last resort for 
individuals seeking redress under the California Constitution. 
Ravpn V. npnkme-iian. 52 Cal. 3d 336, 353 (1990). United States 
Supreme Court decisions are therefore less influential in state 
constitutional construction when there are "cogent reasons" or 
"strong countervailing circumstances" to support construing 
similar state constitutional language separately. XiL. at 353.
California has an especially vital interest in protecting 
individual liberties against uncertainty in federal 
jurisprudence. Failure to do so would leave state citizens
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subject to the vicissitudes of the national political will. 
Additionally, no more cogent reason for independently evaluating 
the state constitution exists than the possibility that 
constitutional protections might be vulneradsle to judicial 
dispute.
In this case, the Court and Mrs. Smith both face tension 9^^ 
uncertainty in a newly contested area of United States Supreme 
Court jurisprudence. That Court’s decision in Smit.h upset 
twenty-five years of recognized free exercise principles, leavi^iS’ 
in their place a divided Court and a seriously questioned free 
exercise analysis. See, e.g.. Smith. 494 U.S. at 892 (1990) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring, discussing Smith’s inconsistency with 
prior free exercise cases).
As a result of this uncertainty. Justice Souter in Churoh JiS- 
Lukumi has suggested the United States Supreme Court revisit th® 
holding in Smith when an appropriate case comes before it. il3 
S.Ct. at 2243 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Thomas, 
likewise, would have granted review in Swanner v. Anchrfrf^gn 
Rights Comm'n. to review Smith in light of Congress’ passing 
RFRA. 874 P.2d 274 (1994), cert, denied _U.S._. 115 S.Ct. 460 
(1994) (Thomas, J.J., dissenting). Under these unique 
circumstances, only this Court’s steadiness can guarantee J
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fairness for Mrs. Smith and predictability for all Californians 
in this fundamentally important area of law. This Court should 
not deviate from its prior holdings adopting the Sherbert 
balancing test on independent state grounds.
B. The Compelling Interest Teat Applies Under the Federal 
Conatitutional Analyais.
1. The incidental effects teat announced in Smith
does not apply to non-criminal statutes.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Smith/ 
that a generally applicable law which only incidentally burdens 
religion does not violate the Free Exercise Clause, applied to a 
criminal statute. 494 U.S. at 872. In the instant case, the 
state has not "criminalized the underlying conduct" subject to 
regulation, and the rule in Smith does not apply.
The respondents in Smith were denied unemployment benefits 
on the basis of their violation of a criminal prohibition against 
ingesting peyote. Their free exercise rights were determined in 
context of Oregon’s criminal law. Indeed, the Court in Smith 
said that unemployment compensation was a context in which the 
.qhf*rhert balancing test would otherwise continue to apply. 
at 884.
The Ninth Circuit relied on similar reasoning in holding 
that Smith does not apply in cases involving civil rights
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n.l (9th Cir. 1994) (citing N.L.R.B. v. Hanna Bova Ctr. 940 F.2<i
statutes.' -gee \’rrr\nV Anaelea. 27 F.3d 1385, 1393
1295 (9th Cir. 1991), fiflrt. dsaisd, __U.S._, 112 S.Ct. 2965 
(1992)). The Ninth Circuit in Hanna described four elements of 
Smith■ where there was no free exercise violation: (1) the 
challenged law is generally applicable; (2) it does not have as 
its object the burdening of religion; (3) it implicates no other 
constitutional right; and (4) it punishes criminal conduct.
Hanna at 1305 (citing The Supreme Court. 1989 Term - Leading 
Cases■ 104 Harv. L. Rev, 198, 201 (1990)).
On its facts, the single subsequent United States Supreme 
Court free exercise case has not determined otherwise. The 
statute invalidated under the incidental effects test in Church 
of T.nWiiTTi-i like the statute in Smith, was a criminal prohibition.
2 . Fvpn if Smith applies to non-criminal_statuteg.
compelling interest test rather than the 
-incidental effects test should be applied to FEHA.
The decision in Smith did not overrule prior federal free 
exercise cases. Assuming arouendo 'that Smith applies to non­
criminal laws, the compelling interest test may still be asserted 
under a federal free exercise analysis on at least two grounds. I
‘ other federal courts have not limited Smith’s holding to criminal 
statutes.
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First, the Sherbert compelling interest test remains the rule in 
unemployment compensation cases. Second, it remains the rule in 
cases where more than one constitutional right is implicated. 
Smith. 494 U.S. at 882. The second condition is true in this 
case.
Mrs. Smith's free exercise claim corresponds with the hybrid 
constitutional scenario described in Smith. liL. Mrs. Smith's 
federal free speech and due process rights are both implicated in 
the facts presented here.
First, the Commission's order that Mrs. Smith post notices 
declaring that she violated FEHA directly imposed on her First 
Amendment free speech right. U.S. Const, amend. I.
Second, Mrs. Smith is deprived of property as well as 
religious liberty under FEHA. If the Commission's decision 
stands, it runs afoul of due process by denying Mrs. Smith the 
full effect of the California laws guaranteeing the possession of 
property and the pursuit of business. Cal. Const, art. I, §§ 1, 
8.
Ranking v. Comm'n on Professional Competence of Ducor Union 
.qrhool Pi strict. construing these important rights, held that the 
California Constitution required employers to accommodate 
employee religious practices. 24 Cal. 3d 167 (1979). The same
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constitutional provision specifies the right to pursue business 
without disqualification on the basis of creed. Cal. Const, art 
I, § 8.
Under the Commission's construction of FEHA, Mrs. Smith was 
denied the benefit of this provision, which requires reasonable 
accommodation of her religious practices. Such a denial violates 
the mandate that no person be deprived of property without due 
process of law. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. Therefore, because 
multiple constitutional rights are implicated in this case, the 
compelling interest test is required.
3. The uncertainty resulting from Smith auaaeatg
incidental effects test should only be apoliPfi -j ^
very narrow circumstances.
The precedential value of Smith has been questioned on the 
grounds that its rule was announced sua sponte. without full
argument before the Court; and on grounds that its rule was not Ii
necessary to resolve the case before the Court. Church of 
Lukumi. ii3 s.Ct. at 2247 (Souter, J., concurring). Under the 
federal constitutional analysis, this Court must enforce the rule 
of Smith only if it applies to the facts presented in this case. 
The questions raised by susbsequent cases and commentators’’ are j
’ Over 100 constitutional law scholars, for example, unsuccessfully 1 
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a re-hearing of Smith. ■
Gunther, Constitutional Law 1584 (12th ed. 1991). 9
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serious, and suggest, at least, that Smith should be applied only 
very narrowly in the federal free exercise context.
4. If this Court determines the incidental effsct.a
test is mandated bv the federal constitutional
analysis, the result mav not prevail against the
independent state analysis.
United States Supreme Court decisions defining fundamental
rights are to be followed by California courts only when they
provide equal or greater individual protection than is guaranteed
by California law. Serrano v. Priest. 18 Cal. 3d 728 (1976).
Where Supreme Court decisions provide less constitutional
protection than California law, they are entitled to great
deference but are not superior authority. Raven. 52 Cal. 3d at
353 (citing Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker. 12 Cal. 2d 85 (1938)).
As long as the California constitutional free exercise protection
is greater than the federal constitutional free exercise
protection, the independent state analysis must prevail.
C. RFRA Mandates the Sherbert CompellinQ Interest Test.
RFRA is the statutory enactment of the constitutional free
exercise test set out in Sherbert and Yoder. 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000bb(b)(1). RFRA reads, in pertinent part:
Government shall not substantially burden a person's 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule 
of general applicability, except ... . Government may 
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if
25
it demonstrates that application of the burden to the pers^^ 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest'* 
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-l(a), (b).
1. California must enforce RFRA
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution 
commands state courts to enforce federal statutes. U.S. Const, 
art. VI; Testa V.—Katt./ 330 U.S. 386 (1947) . A state court may 
question the constitutionality of a federal statute, but if the 
statute is determined to be constitutional, it must be given tb® 
effect Congress intended. Miller v. Municipal Cnu-rt. 22 Cal. 2d 
818 (1943). On the question of Congress' power to interpret th® 
Constitution, however, a state court may not offer an advisory 
opinion. See People v. Roberts. 2 Cal. 4th 271 (1992), cert. I 
denied. 113 S.Ct. 436. I
2. RFRA is constitutional under the Fourteenth IAmendment• I
Congress found its authority to restore the pre-Smith legal * 
standard to free exercises cases in,section one of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const, amend- 
XIV, § 1. The First Amendment is applied to the states through 
section one, which forbids states from depriving "any person of
Ilife, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
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Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Cantwell. 310 U.S. 296. See Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141 (1993), reprinted in 
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, Legislative History. Congress is 
authorized to enforce RFRA by section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 5.
Courts have never confronted the question of Congressional 
power to enforce broader First Amendment rights than are 
minimally provided by constitutional interpretation. However, 
Congress has enforced provisions of the Bill of Rights in other 
contexts and relied on this history in considering RFRA.
Hearings on the matter weighed "the superior factfinding 
capability of Congress, as compared to the courts, on broad 
questions of the true (and invidious) character of certain 
discriminatory practices." Scott C. Idelman, The Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power.
73 Tex. L. Rev. 247, 306 (1994) (citation omitted).
Indeed, the political process embodied by Congress means it 
is the "ideal forum for determining when decisions traditionally 
made at the state level should be supplanted by national 
solutions", and thus these congressional judgments "ought 
normally to be binding on the courts." Idelman at 314 (citing
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William Cohen, Congressional Power tQ Interprets rhie 
Rryiial pnotection. 27 Stan. L. Rev. 603 (1975)).
Several cases establish very broad Congressional power to 
enforce the Reconstruction Amendments in both the equal 
protection and the voting rights contexts, for example.
zpatrick v. Bitizer. interpreting section two of the Fourteentl^ 
Amendment, stands for the proposition that federalism principles 
which might in other circumstances hinder Congressional authority 
are overriden by Congress' power to enforce the Reconstruction 
Amendments by appropriate legislation. 427 U.S. 445 (1976) . 
Similarly, Rome v. United States upheld the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 and stated that Congressional authority under section two of 
the Fifteenth Amendment is no less broad than under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause. 446 U.S. 156 (1980) .
To be consistent. Congress' power to enforce the Free 
Exercise Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment should be 
similarly far-reaching.
3. RFRA preempts FEHA to require the compelling 
interest analysis in this oshp.
Congress may preempt state authority by expressly or 
implicitly stating its intentions to do so. Pacific Gas & El pc.. 
Cq. v. State Energy Comm'n.. 461 U.S. 190 (1983). State law is
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also preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with 
federal law, as when a state law "stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress." Id- at 190 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz. 312 U.S.
52 (1941)).
RFRA explicitly preempts state law, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb- 
3(a). Furthermore, any construction of FEHA which fails to adopt 
the compelling interest test directly conflicts with RFRA. FEHA 
may not frustrate RFRA's purpose. Applying the incidental 
effects test to this case would impermissibly subvert the stated 
objectives of RFRA, whose goal it was to oppose the rule in 
Smith. Accordingly, FEHA must be construed to require balancing 
and strict scrutiny of state actions impinging free exercise. 
Otherwise, it is invalid.
III. MRS. SMITH'S CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO FREELY
EXERCISE RELIGION IS IMPERMISSIBLY VIOLATED WHEN BALANCED 
AGAINST THE STATE INTEREST IN FEHA.
Mrs. Smith's religious beliefs require her to refuse renting 
her property to unmarried couples. Her freedom to exercise 
religious precepts embodies our society's paramount social and 
constitutional values. This fundamental liberty is never more 
meaningful than when, as in this case, its exercise does not 
conform to secular majoritarian sensibilities. Not only is the
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"depth and beauty" of national life preserved when minority 
religious beliefs are respected, but the "precious heritage of 
our history" under the First Amendment is also maintained. 
People V. Woody. 61 Cal. 2d at 727.
Mrs. Smith's sincerely held religious belief is 
substantially burdened by the Commission's operation of FEHA.
Furthermore, the Commission has not demonstrated that it has a 
compelling interest in abridging Mrs. Smith's religious belief. 
The need to efficiently administer housing regulations simply 
does not rise above this fundamental liberty. Even if the state 
could demonstrate a compelling interest in FEHA, it has not met 
the additional requirement that operation of FEHA must be 
narrowly tailored to its purpose.
A. Mrs. Smith Holds a Sincere Religious Belief.
A court may inquire into the sincerity of a religious 
belief, but not the truth or falsity of that belief. Unitf^H
States V. Ballard. 322 U.S. 78, '86-88, (1944). Mrs. Smith is a j 
twenty-five year member of the Bidwell Presbyterian Church in fl 
Chico. (C.T. 4.) This fact by itself would be sufficient to • 
establish her sincerely held religious belief. Ballard. 322 U.S*] 
78 (1944) . She sincerely believes that it is a sin to shelter, ■ 
and thereby collude in, a sexual partnership outside of marriage-
30
(C.T. 20.) The Department of Fair Employment and Housing was 
convinced of Mrs. Smith's sincerity and remarked on it in its 
decision against her. (C.T. 10.) The Commission has agreed by 
stipulation that Mrs. Smith's religious belief is sincere.
B, Mrs. Smith's Religious Belief is Substantially Burdened
bv FEHA.
To be subject to a free exercise challenge, the government 
action must impose a substantial burden on the conduct that 
emanates from a sincere religious belief. Wisconsin v. Yoder.
406 U.S. 205 (1972) . A substantial burden has generally been 
established when a person is "forced to choose between following 
the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one 
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order 
to [enjoy the benefit], on the other hand." Shcrbart/ 374 U.S. 
at 400.
The benefits FEHA denies Mrs. Smith are enjoyment of her 
property rights, and her right to operate a business. Mrs. 
Smith's right not to be disqualified from business expresses the 
public policy of the State of California and is guaranteed by its 
Constitution. See Badick v. Myera. 36 Cal. App. 4th 1289 (1995). 
Article I, section one of the California Constitution reads, in 
pertinent part: "All people . . . have inalienable rights. Among
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Cal.these are . . . possessing, and protecting property."
Const, art. I, § 1. Section eight says: ''A person may not be 
disqualified from entering or pursuing a business, profession, 
vocation or employment because of . . . creed." Cal. Const, art. 
I, § 8. Because these are constitutional rights, certainly their 
denial creates a burden even more substantial than the denial of 
unemployment benefits in Sherbert.
Additionally, the practical effects on Mrs. Smith's rights 
to business and property, should she be forced not to enter the 
housing market rather than forego her religious convictions, ar^ 
considerable. Mrs. Smith owns two duplexes, rents from which 
constitute her sole source of income. If she is denied the 
ability to profit from their rental, her single capital 
investment will have no long-term economic value.
The state may not offer Mrs. Smith a "Hobson's" choice by 
which she is made to choose between her rights to business and 
property and her right to freely practice .religion.® For Mrs. 
Smith, there is no choice. In order to respect her religious 
beliefs, she must not rent to unmarried couples. The Commission
* Hobson's choice: An apparent freedom of choice with no real
alternative. After Thomas Hobson (died 1631), English liveryman, who required
his customers to take the next available horse rather than give them a choice-
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 544 (5th ed. 1976).
recognized the seriousness of this burden. It noted: "We do not 
doubt the depth and sincerity of [Mrs. Smith's] religious 
convictions, and we are sensitive to the burden[s] that 
respondent will bear for adherence to those convictions if the 
FEH Act is enforced against her." (C.T. 10.) The Commission 
failed to accord these burdens proper weight. Mrs. Smith's 
rights to property and business are "inaliencd^le". Cal. Const, 
art. I. They may not be dispensed with so summarily.
C. The State Has Ho. Compelling Interest in Contravening
Religious Freedom by Mandating Housing Rentals to
Unmarried Couples.
1. Unmarried couples are not protected under FEHA.
FEHA's application to unmarried couples is discussed fully
earlier in this brief. If this Court determines unmarried 
couples are not protected by FEHA, the state has no compelling 
interest in enforcing FEHA in this case.
2. Even if unmarried couples, are protected bv FEHA.
the state's interest in FEHA does not overcome
Mrs. Smith's free exercise right.
Religious freedom is one of the highest values of American
society. Murdock v. Pennsylvania 319 U.S. 105, 115-117 (1943).
Because this freedom is a cornerstone of society, "only those
interests of the highest order . . . can overbalance legitimate
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claims to the free exercise of religion." United Statea v.
455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
State interests have been found to outweigh individual 
religious liberty only under extraordinary circumstances very 
different from those presented here. The decision in Lee. for 
example, that an Amish employer must pay Social Security taxes* 
considered that the entire United States tax system "could not 
function" if mandatory participation were not required. Id. at 
260.
The Court in Lee emphasized that the challenged regulation 
already contained an exemption that protected Amish beliefs, and 
the respondent had voluntarily undertaken an activity that was 
not encompassed by the exception. What distinguished the 
situation presented by an Amish employer resisting payment of 
Social Security taxes, the Court said, was that his employees 
would also be denied benefits on the basis of his religious 
belief. id.
Three critical factors distinguish the potentially dramatic 
results of a religious exemption in Lee from the case here.
First, FEHA's operation is not completely, or even seriously, 
threatened by a constitutional exemption on the basis of 
religious belief. Second, because there are no existing
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religious exemptions under FEHA, Mrs. Smith's activity cannot be 
said to be voluntary in the Lee sense. Third, unlike an 
employer, a landlady has no voluntary commercial relationship 
with merely prospective tenants. Mrs. Smith does not impose her 
faith on possible renters by simply declining to enter into such 
a relationship.
Furthermore, the constitutional and public policy 
protections explicitly guarding religious exemptions in the 
business and employment contexts, which are present in this case, 
were absent in Lfifi- Even if the state's interest in FEHA were - 
sufficiently compelling to overcome Mrs. Smith's free exercise 
right in the context of housing regulations, it cannot be 
imagined that the state's interest would overcome her right to 
freely exercise religion under the additional protection provided 
by Article I, section 8 of the California Constitution.
Finally, FEHA lends itself to the types of considerations 
Smith said were common to an absence of a compelling interest.
It is possible to provide "individualized . . . assessment" of 
requests for exemptions. Smith. 494 U.S. at 884. The Department 
of Fair Employment and Housing already evaluates individual 
incidents of non-compliance, and is empowered not just to enforce 
compliance, but to negotiate alternative resolutions. §§ 12930,
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12931. Furthermore, the California Constitution mandates such 
considerations. Pankins. 24 Cal. 3d 167 (1979).
3, Taw jn comparable areas demonstrates that
a^al-P^g interest, is not compelling.
Even if unmarried couples have a right to be free from 
discrimination in housing, that right is not as compelling as 
right to be free from racial or gender discrimination. A cruci^j 
distinction is that race and gender discrimination are 
constitutionally prohibited. Bob Jones University v^.Unitgc^
States. 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Roberts v. United States Jayceea.
468 U.S. 609 (1984). Marriage might also enjoy constitutional 
protection, but the state of being unmarried does not. Jayceeg, 
468 U.S. 609.
Furthermore, race discrimination "violates a most 
fundamental national policy." Bob Jones. 461 U.S. at 593. No 
fundamental national policy exists to prevent discrimination on 
the basis of marital status.
J"Only those interests of the highest order and those not 1 
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free I 
exercise of religion." Yoder. 406 U.S. at 215. Discrimination 
against unmarried couples fails to meet this high standard.
D. Even If The CommiflgiQn^a Interest Is Compelliny. tHa
State Hag Not Employed the Least Restrictive Means
Available to Implement Ita Policy.
This Court has already determined that employers must
reasonably accommodate their employees' religious practices.
Rankins. 24 Cal. 3d 167 (1979). The solution in Rankins
implemented a state regulation without either obstructing its
purposes, or impeding religion. The pursuit of business is also
protected under the California Constitution. Cal. Const, art, i;
§ 8. FEHA should be construed together with this provision^ to
reasonably accommodate genuine religious beliefs. FEHA cannot fe;
considered narrowly tailored if it fails to take advantage of
such an existing, and required, implementation.
IV. MRS. SMITH'S RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IS IMPERMISSIBLY BURDENED 
UNDER THE INCIDENTAL EFFECTS TEST.
Under the incidental effects test adopted by Smith and 
explained in Church of Lukumi. a statute that is not neutral and 
generally applicable must be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest. Church of Lukumi. 113 S.Ct. at 2233. 
Normally, non-neutral statutes will not survive such strict 
scrutiny. Id. In other words, regulations that are not neutral 
will not often be justified by a compelling government interest. 
Inherent in the incidental effects test, then, is a presumption
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that non-neutral statutes do not advance compelling state 
interests by narrowly tailored means.
A. FEHA la Not a Neutral Law.
Facial neutrality is not determinative. Id. at 2227. The 
"effect of the law in its real operation is strong evidence of 
the object." Id. FEHA, as construed by the Commission, is a 
non-neutral statute. The Commission's operation of FEHA violates 
the requirement of the California Constitution that a person may 
not be disqualified from pursuing a business or profession 
because of religion. FEHA therefore discriminates on that basl^. 
Cal. Const. art. I, § 6.
B. FEHA Is Not a. Generally Applicable Law.
A law which imposes burdens selectively on religious 
conduct, and not other harmful conduct, is not generally 
applicable. Church of Lukumi. 113 S.Ct. at 2228-29. Article t, 
section eight provides a mechanism by which exemptions from FEHA 
could be reasonably applied. Moreover, the Commission employs 
specified exemptions from FEHA in other areas, and should be held 
to the same standard with respect to religious exemptions, s^e. 
e.g.. FEHA's exemption permitting postsecondary educational 
institutions to reserve housing for married students. §
12995(b).
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The Smith Court anticipated such a situation when it stated 
that a statutory scheme which had an existing mechanism for 
assessing and providing exemptions, but failed to apply the 
exemptions uniformly, would not pass its requirements. Smith.
494 U.S. at 860.
Furthermore, FEHA's privileging of marital status has the 
straightforward effect of burdening primarily religious beliefs. 
As a general rule, only those persons who understand marriage tQ; 
be sacred might be expected to object to xinmarried couple*. This 
fact by itself makes FEHA less than generally applicable. As t^ 
seminal case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins made clear over 100 years ago, 
discrimination is the result if the application of a statute is 
unequal: 118 U.S. 356 (1886). On this basis alone, FEHA should
be subject to strict scrutiny of its purposes.
C. Even Under The Incidental Effects Test, the State. Fails
to Demonstrate a Compelling Interest in Abridging
Religious Freedom.
Because FEHA is not neutral, the state must demonstrate a 
compelling interest in advancing its purposes. Under the 
balancing test advanced in Sherbert. the state was presumed to be 
pursuing a legitimate, even if broadly defined, interest. Under 
the Smith requirements, however, if the state regulation reaches 
the balancing test at all, it has already been revealed as
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discriminatory either on its face or by its effect. In this 
case, the Commission's construction of FEHA is neither neutral
nor justified by a compelling state interest. It must not be 
allowed to stand.
CONCLUSION
The state should not be allowed to confuse social acceptanci^ 
of unmarried couples with a constitutional mandate to trample 
religious liberty. Furthermore, the Commission should be- 
required to take advantage of the existing state constitutional 
standard for evaluating and implementing free exercise exemption^ 
to FEHA.
Mrs. Smith respectfully requests that this Court overturn 
that portion of the decision of the Court of Appeal applying FEH^. 
to unmarried couples. Additionally, Mrs. Smith asks the Court t® 
affirm the Court of Appeal's decision vacating the Commission's 
finding and granting her a religious freedom exemption from FEHA- 
Dated: October 26, 1995 Respectfully submitted.
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